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SURVEY SECTION
Business Law. In re McBurney Law Services, Inc., 798 A.2d 877
(R.I. 2002). The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that prior to a
hearing of a valuation panel appointed by the supreme court to de-
termine the fair market value of shares of a corporation, a stipula-
tion; that is (1) entered into with the assent of counsel and their
clients, (2) relative to an evidentiary fact or an element of a claim,
and (3) absent fraud or mutual mistake, is conclusive upon the par-
ties and removes the issue from the controversy. The court also
held that interest on the purchase price of the shares begins to ac-
crue from the date of the election to purchase the shares.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The petitioner, McBurney Law Services, Inc. (McBurney Law),
is a professional service corporation engaged in the practice of
law.' The respondent, Kevin McBurney, became a shareholder of
McBurney Law in 1982, and he voluntarily terminated his employ-
ment on July 29, 1993.2 Respondent held twenty-five shares of
common stock in McBurney Law. 3 McBurney Law, as a profes-
sional service corporation engaged in the practice of law, was gov-
erned by article II, rule 10(g) of the Rhode Island Supreme Court
Rules, which states, "If a shareholder dies or becomes ineligible,
the professional service corporation shall: (1) Redeem the share-
holder's shares ... or (2) Cause the shareholder's shares to be pur-
chased by an eligible person or persons."4 McBurney Law neither
redeemed respondent's shares nor caused them to be purchased by
an eligible person, and respondent neither transferred his shares
to an eligible person nor offered them to McBurney Law for re-
demption. 5 Pursuant to rule 10(g), McBumey Law and respondent
had three months to agree on the fair market value of the shares
or, failing an agreement, McBurney Law was required to apply to
the Rhode Island Supreme Court for appointment of a valuation
panel to determine the fair market value of the shares.6 There was
1. In re MeBurney Law Servs., Inc., 798 A.2d 877, 879 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 879 n.1 (quoting R.I. SUPER. CT. R. 10(g)).
5. Id. at 880.
6. Id.
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no agreement, and at that time, McBurney Law did not file a peti-
tion for appointment of a valuation panel.7
On January 13, 2000, McBurney Law filed a petition for ap-
pointment of a valuation panel, and the supreme court granted the
petition.8 On June 5, 2000, prior to the hearing of the valuation
panel, McBurney Law and respondent entered into a written stipu-
lation providing that respondent "shall be deemed to have owned
25% of the issued and outstanding shares of stock as of the
[vialuation [dlate."9 Respondent later moved to modify the stipula-
tion based on later-acquired information that showed respondent
to be the owner of one-third of the shares issued, rather than the
previously stipulated twenty-five percent.' 0 The valuation panel
granted the respondent's motion."
McBurney Law filed a petition for certiorari in the supreme
court seeking review of the valuation panel's decision that the stip-
ulation entered into by the parties could be modified.12 McBurney
Law also challenged the panel's decision to award prejudgment in-
terest from the date respondent voluntarily ended his employment
with McBurney Law, arguing that the appropriate date was when
McBurney Law filed the petition for appointment of the valuation
panel. 13
ANALYSIs AND HOLDING
Stipulation
The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that stipulated agree-
ments must be placed on the record or be reduced to an agreed
upon writing so the stipulation does not become a source of further
controversy, and that the stipulation in this case met those re-
quirements. 14 The court held that a "stipulation entered into with
the assent of counsel and their clients, relative to an evidentiary
fact or an element of a claim, is conclusive upon the parties and
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. (alteration in original).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 881.
14. Id. at 881-82.
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removes the issue from the controversy." 5 Such a conclusive stip-
ulation is not a matter for consideration by the valuation panel. 16
The court further stated that a stipulation "has the attributes of a
consent order or consent judgment and cannot be set aside simply
because a litigant no longer wants to be bound by its terms.' 7
Justice Flanders dissented. He stated that the valuation
panel possessed the authority to vacate the stipulation and that
because the stipulation afforded respondent a lesser ownership in-
terest in McBurney Law than was later discovered he possessed,
enforcement of the stipulation "would not be conducive to the inter-
ests of truth or justice."' 8
Interest
The court also stated that since neither rule 10(g) of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court Rules nor section 7-5.1-5 of the Rhode Is-
land General Laws provide for an award of prejudgment interest
on the valuation reached by the panel, the panel could not award
such interest to the respondent.' 9 The court did state, however,
that the Rhode Island Professional Service Corporation Act refers
to chapter 7-1.1 of the Rhode Island General Laws and provides
that the Rhode Island Business Corporations Act shall apply to
professional business corporations. 20 Therefore, in a case such as
this one, in which a corporation elects to purchase the shares of an
ineligible shareholder, section 7-1.1-90 of the Rhode Island Gen-
eral Laws sets forth a procedure for the valuation and sale of the
shareholder's shares.21 In such a situation, "the shareholder is en-
titled to interest, at the rate on judgments in civil actions, on the
purchase price of the shares from the date of the filing of the elec-
tion to purchase the shares ...."22 Based on this provision, the
court stated that the valuation panel was without authority to set
a different date at which to begin the accrual of interest, and the
15. Id.
16. Id. at 882.
17. Id. (citing DeFusco v. Giorgio, 440 A.2d 727, 729 (R.I. 1982)).
18. Id. at 885-86 (Flanders, J., dissenting)
19. Id. at 884.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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date in this case should have been set at January 13, 2000, the
date on which McBurney Law filed the petition for valuation. 23
Justice Flanders dissented on this issue as well. He stated
that the election-to-purchase statute was not applicable to this pro-
ceeding because McBurney Law did not elect to purchase respon-
dent's shares, rather, it was required to do so by law under rule
10(g).24 He further asserted that it was McBurney Law's responsi-
bility to apply to the supreme court for a valuation panel after Mc-
Burney Law and respondent did not agree on a buyout
agreement. 25 Because McBurney Law did not do so, it was proper
to set the date for the accrual of interest at the date on which re-
spondent voluntarily ended his employment with McBurney Law,
rather than to set the date at the date on which McBurney Law
finally filed a petition for valuation.26
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
valuation panel, holding that prior to a hearing of a valuation
panel appointed by the supreme court to determine the fair market
value of shares of a corporation, a stipulation that is (1) entered
into with the assent of counsel and their clients, (2) relative to an
evidentiary fact or an element of a claim, and (3) absent fraud or
mutual mistake, is conclusive upon the parties and removes the
issue from the controversy. The court also held that interest on the
purchase price of the shares begins to accrue from the date of the
election to purchase the shares.
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23. Id.
24. Id. at 889-90 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 890 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
26. Id. (Flanders, J., dissenting).
